

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

WASHINGTON

*Draft reply to Carter 15 June*

June 4, 1963

*Action file*

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Pat:

I am writing to ask on behalf of our Department whether CIA would be able to undertake a project for which we understand the Agency to be particularly well equipped. We believe it is time for a careful analytical review of the situation in the Himalayan borderlands, and we hope very much that you will see your way to undertaking the project.

Our picture of the scope needed is along these lines. Each segment of the area might be dealt with separately, to include (a) Ladakh, (b) U.P. - Tibet frontier, (c) Nepal, (d) Sikkim, (e) Bhutan, (f) NEFA, and possibly (g) Nagaland.

Among the relevant considerations for each might be these:

(1) An analysis of vulnerability and strengths:

geographical and topographical characteristics; leadership strengths and limitations; ethnic, religious and other social differences; historic jealousies; the desire for non-Indian alternatives; indigenous capabilities for conventional and counter-insurgency defense; other factors.

(2) Indian policies and practice:

a summary analysis of Indian policies and practice toward each area, with particular reference to Indian efforts to deal with these vulnerabilities.

(3) Communist Chinese strategies:

Communist Chinese strategies for dealing with the borderlands, including strategies already visible and those which are plausibly within Chinese capability and intention.

(4) Conclusion:

Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter,  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence,  
Washington.

State Dept. review completed

*Action memo  
on next page*

CONFIDENTIAL

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	
		SECRET	
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	DDCI	6 June	[Signature]
2	DD/I - your action		
3			
4			
5			
6	(Response date - 13 June 1963)		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> PREPARE REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/>	APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH	<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION
<input type="checkbox"/>	COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/> FILE	<input type="checkbox"/> RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/>	CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE
Remarks:			
Copy has gone to [ ] for info DCI.			
<p>If we have NIS's on these, State should be told - anyway, let DD I talk to State and find out more per Hughes last para - I need a letter telling him who - 6 June</p>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
Executive Director			5 June 63
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

STATINTL

Thomas L. Hughes

Sincerely,

Perhaps as a first step you would care to designate some representative who knows the field and who could talk with our staff on further elaboration of the details. The project would, I think, be eagerly received and it would be a most creditable product for the Agency.

We should be very glad to help in any way we could. It might be specially useful if the executors of the project and appropriate INR staff were to exchange notes on the elements of items (2) and (3), which deal with Indian and Chinese strategies and policies.

(4) Conclusion:  
Identification of the most important vulnerabilities and an estimate of Indian capacity to deal with them.

CONFIDENTIAL